Economic Stimulation Signal on Power Supply Optimization From Distribution Cost Allocation Based on Shapley Value in Integrated Energy Park

Abstract

This paper discussed the economic incentives of the distribution cost distribution based on the Shapley value of cooperative game in the integrated energy service park for the optimization of the park’s power supply mode. The application of cooperative game in the distribution of power distribution costs gives an economic signal reflecting the difference in power supply to users in the park. In the concept of multiple solutions in cooperative game theory, the Shapley value determines the power flow contribution of each user to the power grid with its uniqueness, determines the user’s power distribution cost based on the power flow, and its economic background also clarifies the user’s responsibilities, and the user chooses differently. The power distribution costs borne by the power supply are also different, thereby promoting power supply optimization. The 5-node calculation example verifies the effectiveness of the distribution cost allocation based on the Shapley value for the economic incentive of power supply optimization.