Abstract
This article examines the involvement of the military in the economy during processes of economic reform and liberalization in non-democratic systems. The hypothesis is that the nature of this involvement is guided by regime survival strategies. Specifically, under dire economic conditions that necessitate liberalization measures, regimes will attempt to promote military loyalty and political survival by minimizing or offsetting the negative effects of economic reform while maximizing positive dividends. The article examines military economic involvement in China, Cuba, and Syria, and emphasizes the need for more cross-regional studies.
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