Abstract
This article proposes and applies a unified model of economic voting. The central claim of this article is that economic judgments affect the decision of whether to vote as well as how to vote. An analysis of cross-national survey data supports this claim, demonstrating that previous studies of economic voting have failed to identify the full relationship by omitting abstention. In addition, the analyses support a refined version of the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, showing that institutional clarity moderates the strength and nature of economic voting, with little evidence of vote-switching among parties in low-clarity settings. These findings suggest that students of voting behavior should give greater attention to the relationship between the decisions of whether and how to vote.
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