Abstract

The purpose of the present article is to explore and investigate on the nature of the web of relations of the main Italian banks, on the basis of the evolution of the career paths of their relative members of the Board of Directors. The practical implications of the study is associated with the fact that there is a stronger attention by the national and international financial authorities, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs), about the governance in the banks and the theoretical background and practical abilities of the senior management to assume a specific role in a financial institution. That condition determines a situation in which a member of the board of a European bank tends to have previous job experiences from other financial institutions, which can be used as informal liaisons to gathering information and disseminate knowledge, thus shaping the whole banking infrastructure. For that reason, due to the significant consequences of that bond of relations in shaping the entire financial system, the subject of the research consists in trying to measure the Economic Intelligence aptitudes of the most significant Italian banks, which derives from personal relationships constructed and developed by the senior management of the financial intermediaries in their previous job experiences. The novelty of the present article consists in conducting an Economic Intelligence analysis within the Italian banking system. Methodology. By calculating the main centrality indexes (among those offered by the Social Network Analysis discipline) related to each Italian bank within the global banking network constructed on the basis of personal relationships among the relative members of the Board of Directors, it is possible to measure a financial institution’s inclination to have a sort of “influence” in the system, and in the process, to adopt a potential sound and proper Economic Intelligence strategy. The basic result of the paper highlights that, notwithstanding the dimension of a financial institution in the network, a bank could be characterized by significant centrality indexes in a web of social relations, thus having the potential capability to have a certain influence and impact within the entire banking network. In other words, the size of the bank, expressed for example as number of branches, total assets or number of employees, is not the only element to express the capacity of a bank to play a pivotal role in the financial system.

Highlights

  • With the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the beginning of the banking supervision, the European Central Bank (ECB) has introduced some underlying rules and regulations to be fully harmonized across all the countries belonging to the Eurosystem organization, in order to ensure the highest standards in fit and proper supervision

  • The Capital Requirements Directive IV – CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council) and the guidelines on the suitability of members of the management body provided by the European Banking Authority – EBA

  • A relevant component of the members of the board of directors of banks located in a European country belonging to the Eurosystem possesses a previous experience in one or more financial institutions

Read more

Summary

Introduction

One of the most significant criteria for the fit and proper assessment is represented by an adequate level of banking experience, showing that the potential candidate has the theoretical background and practical capabilities to assume a specific role in a bank. That specific situation generates an interesting web of informal connections among different banks, based on dissimilar social and personal relations between members of their Boards of Directors following previous working experience. Those connections could constitute potential communication channels among distinctive financial institutions for transmitting information, transferring code of conducts or models for conducting banking activities, and unconventional instruments (alternative to the control deriving from strategic and commercial agreements or equity ownerships) to “influence” other banks

Objectives
Methods
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call