Abstract
This paper constructs a dynamic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of child labor laws on human capital accumulation and the distribution of welfare. We find that the welfare consequences of a policy reform for agents depend crucially on the main source of household income. Households with large asset holdings would never support government intervention. High-wage workers benefit most from a ban on child labor, while low-wage workers benefit most from mandatory education. Utilitarian social welfare increases to a greater extent with mandatory, publicly financed education than with a child labor ban or a combination of both policies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
