Abstract
In 2014, the new Ukrainian authorities decided to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy course. The EU supported this ambition: an Association Agreement with Ukraine was signed. This paved the way for the use of economic incentives, conditioned by the introduction of specific reforms. Besides acting within the EU, the Polish government also proposed independent support, mainly in the form of development assistance. Thus, this article aims to evaluate the efficacy of the Polish economic incentives, as well as to identify the factors that either strengthen or weaken such effectiveness. In this process, multiple variables are applied in the contexts of Polish policy goals and the situation in Ukraine. The article concludes that the applied incentives are properly aligned with the objectives that have been set. They could be effective despite the political obstacles in both Poland and Ukraine.
Highlights
In the twenty-first century, the gradual economization of foreign policy, stemming from growing economic interdependencies, can be observed
It encourages states and international organizations to use economic tools to achieve political goals, applying economic statecraft as defined by Baldwin: ‘influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money’
This article aims to assess a set of Polish economic incentives as tools of foreign policy toward Ukraine
Summary
In the twenty-first century, the gradual economization of foreign policy, stemming from growing economic interdependencies, can be observed. It encourages states and international organizations to use economic tools to achieve political goals, applying economic statecraft as defined by Baldwin: ‘influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money’. Baldwin distinguishes the negative sanctions (penalties) from the positive ones (actual or promised rewards) (Baldwin 1985, 13–14). Applying the liberal concept of relative gains, Long (1996, 22–31) claims that in many cases incentives could be more effective than sanctions. For the benefactor (the donor), incentives may open new trade and investment opportunities that are gainful for the recipient
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
