Abstract
The aim of the paper was to explore economic effects of corruption in judiciary. The examination included the analysis of economic features of judiciary and economic mechanisms of corruption in judiciary within the theoretical framework of Backer's model of criminal behavior. The analysis demonstrates that corruption in judiciary violates the rule of law, hence undermines the fundaments of market economy and specialization, i.e. social division of labor as the ground for improving economic efficiency. As to the static economic efficiency, the most important effect of corruption in judiciary is transaction costs that are generated and the consequent allocative inefficiency. As to the dynamic economic efficiency, corruption decreases economic growth rates and reallocates recourses from productive to distributive activities. The effects of corruption in judiciary to economic inequality are not significant, particularly not comparing with the already identified effects to the economic efficiency.
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