Abstract
We examine whether U.S. firms’ MA (2) firms that acquire targets with relatively poor accounting quality are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (3) clawbacks improve investor perception of MA and (4) executives are more responsive to the market when completing M&A deals if their compensation contracts include clawbacks. These results suggest that boards take a pro-active approach and consider factors that may lead to restatements when adopting clawbacks. Our results have implications for U.S. policymakers, as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires mandatory adoption of clawbacks. Our results also suggest that non-U.S. firms can reduce managerial incentives to manipulate post-takeover earnings by using clawbacks.
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