Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order

Abstract

N v 'OW as never before economic considerations dominate the international as well as the domestic political scene. The claims of the developing countries to a fairer share of the world's economic pie are being heard-and are often being followed by co-ordinated action by groups of these countries to back up such claims. The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, which turned OPEC from a paper tiger into a permanent force to be reckoned with internationally, was merely the first indication of what the future holds in store. Subsequent collective action by the International Association of Producers of Bauxite has succeeded in boosting the price of that mineral, albeit nowhere near so spectacularly as in the case of oil,' and the recent decision of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries to cut shipment by 10 per cent in an effort to shore up the price of copper, while so far having little effect, may cause further economic difficulties for the industrial countries in the not too distant future.2 Reaction to the above developments, especially the traumatic oil embargo, has been swift and predictable. Calling it 'blackmail', a phrase later used by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the columnist William Buckley contended in November 1973 that ' [i]t is both a moral and a legal question whether the Arab embargo has reached the point of asphyxiation that warrants belligerent reprisals '. Although with the easing of the embargo last summer this crisis atmosphere passed, in September the US Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, was still explaining that the United States was ' not contemplating' any military action against the Arab oil producers,4 and in late November The Times reported the study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on 'Oil and Security' under the headline: 'Military action against oil nations deemed unlikely'.'