Ecological Representations

Abstract

Representations feature heavily in cognitive science theories about our behavioral repertoire. Their critical feature is its ability to designate (stand in for) spatially or temporally distant properties, so that organizing our behavior with respect to mental/neural representations means organizing our behavior with respect to the otherwise unavailable property they designate. Representations are a powerful tool, but serious problems (grounding, system-detectable error) remain unsolved. Ecological explanations reject representations. However, this has left us without a straightforward vocabulary to engage with “representation-hungry” problems involving spatial or temporal distance, nor the role of the nervous system in cognition. To develop such a vocabulary, here we show that ecological information functions to designate the ecologically scaled dynamical world to an organism. We then show that this designation analysis of information leads to an ecological conceptualization of the neural activity caused by information, and finally we argue these together can support intentional behavior with respect to spatially and temporally distal properties. The way they do so (via designation) does mean information and the related neural activity can be conceptualized as representations; but they do so in a grounded way that remains true to key ecological ontological commitments. We advocate this path for expanding the ecological approach.