Abstract
Both ecological psychology and enaction theory offer an alternative to long-standing theoretical approaches to perception that invoke post-perceptual supplemental processes or structures, e.g., mental representations, to account for perceptual phenomena. They both do so by taking actions by the individual to be essential for an account of perception and cognition. The question that this paper attempts to address is whether ecological psychology and enaction theory can be integrated into a stronger non-representational alternative to perception than either one can offer on its own. Doing so is only possible if most of the basic tenets and concepts of ecological psychology and enaction theory are compatible. Based on an examination of the role that sensations play within each approach; the manner in which each treats the concept of information; and how each conceptualizes an organism’s boundaries, it is concluded that a synthesis of the two approaches is not possible. Particular attention is paid to the concept of sensations, the limitations of which were an impetus for the development of ecological psychology.
Highlights
Most explanations of visual perception that have been offered in recent centuries, and in particular those following the tradition of British Empiricist philosophy, adhere to a common metatheoretical template: sources of stimulation in the environment innervate sensory receptors, which give rise to elementary sensations that function as the basic components of perceptual experience
The ecological approach to perception and enaction theory are distinctive among perceptual theories for advocating a theoretical approach that rejects an appeal to mental representations or post-perceptual processes to account for experience of the environment
In order to examine the areas of difference between ecological psychology and enaction theory, it will be useful here at the outset to recognize that the starting points in the formulation of these two approaches differ
Summary
Reviewed by: Gunnar Declerck, University of Technology Compiegne, France Jelle Bruineberg, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. Both ecological psychology and enaction theory offer an alternative to long-standing theoretical approaches to perception that invoke post-perceptual supplemental processes or structures, e.g., mental representations, to account for perceptual phenomena. They both do so by taking actions by the individual to be essential for an account of perception and cognition. Doing so is only possible if most of the basic tenets and concepts of ecological psychology and enaction theory are compatible.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
