Ecological justice and justice as impartiality

Abstract

Ecological justice concerns the distribution of environments between life‐forms. This paper seeks to integrate this concept with Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. The latter aims to be a theory of justice which is impartial between substantive theories of the good. Issues of ecological justice are noted within Barry's theory, but are subsumed under one such substantive theory of the good, namely ecocentrism. This subsumption of ecological justice under a substantive theory of the good turns out to imply that justice as impartiality on Barry's account is readily compatible with the extermination of other species ‐ if, for example, ecocentrism has few supporters. However, the concept of the ‘community of justice’ can be separated from substantive conceptions of the good and used to develop a version of justice as impartiality which builds in ecological justice to its foundations, thereby making the justice of exterminations much harder to establish. Doing this requires pondering further the ideas of fairness and reasonable agreement in the contract situation which is central to Barry's theory and focusing upon the various ‘inarticulates’ who are unable to defend their interests within contract situations. It is clear that justice as impartiality cannot avoid substantive moral dispute over such matters.