Abstract
This article investigates the fixed-fee licensing contract in a mixed duopoly where public and private firms may purchase eco-technology from a foreign innovator. We show that the foreign innovator chooses either an exclusive or a non-exclusive licensing contract, depending on (i) the cost gap between the two firms, (ii) the environmental damage caused by pollutants, and (iii) whether a public firm is privatized or not. We further examine the welfare consequences of non-exclusive licensing, exclusive licensing and discriminatory fixed-fee licensing contracts, respectively, and show that privatization improves social welfare when both cost gap and environmental damage are large.
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