Abstract
Eccles cites three items of physiological evidence for a self-conscious mind: experiments by Libet, showing that consciousness can antedate sensory experience; slow build-up of the readiness potential, showing that the mind is weak; that brain events are scattered, but consciousness is a unity. I argue that none of the three items has any significance: the first is a confusion about the experimental evidence; the second indicates weak physical forces, no mind; the third replaces visible structures by intangible influences. Thus, these physiological arguments do not support the contention that non-physical influences are at work.
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