Abstract
An external-cavity laser (ECL) operating in a chaotic state is usually used in a chaotic optical secure communication system and its feedback length (FL) is often regarded as an additional key. Our analyses show that an eavesdropper's (Eve) laser can synchronize with a transmitter (Alice) without any knowledge of the FL by simply increasing the injection strength. A sequence of a 1 Gbit/s nonreturn-to-zero message encoded by the FL as the key is successfully eavesdropped. The reason for the synchronization deviation between Alice's and Eve's lasers is given. Our results indicate that the FL as a key cannot enhance the security of chaotic optical communication using long-ECLs.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
