Abstract
Why did East and Central European countries decide to join NATO after the Warsaw Pact dissolved? This article analyzes NATO expansion from the perspective of the Central and East European applicants for NATO membership. Contrary to the expectations of neo-realist scholars support for NATO membership was costly to build, particularly in Central and East European countries where the perception of threat from Russia was low. The historical evidence I examine indicates that in the early 1990s it was not apparent what post-Cold War security arrangement would best suit the needs of the former Warsaw Pact allies. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Balkan countries, which had not experienced or been threatened by Soviet invasion, NATO membership was neither a clear choice nor the only security option they could pursue. NATO’s adaptation and expansion challenges neo-realist expectations and supports arguments advanced by neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p1421
Highlights
Despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not cease to exist
The post-Cold War international security outcome we have witnessed through NATO expansion is consistent with Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat argument, which predicts bandwagoning (Walt, 1998)
This paper has explored the issue of NATO adaptation to the new European security configuration through eastward expansion
Summary
Despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not cease to exist. Instead of dissolving, the alliance expanded to include former communist countries that were members of the defunct Warsaw Pact – NATO’s military adversary during the Cold War. I argue that contrary to the expectations of scholars such as Robert Jervis, Charles Kupchan, and Andrew Kydd political support for NATO membership was costly to build in post-communist Europe. I discuss the issue of Bulgarian and Romanian admission to NATO and enlargement because acceptance of Balkan countries in the alliance brought to light political concerns among foreign policy makers in the United States and the other NATO members. In the eyes of Western policy makers and international relations scholars, the decisions of Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO should have been uncontentious, attracting little political opposition. I present evidence which demonstrates that NATO membership was not the only possible way of filling in the security vacuum which emerged with the demise of the Warsaw Pact
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