Abstract
ABSTRACTThe study addresses the signs of earnings management in unlisted companies, comparing the situation in family firms and non-family firms. We adopt arguments from agency theory, and stewardship theory, which are supplemented with the assumptions of socio-emotional wealth literature, to justify our research model. The sample is composed of 263 audited Spanish companies with a turnover of more than 200 million euros, which were analysed in the period from 2011 to 2015. Results indicate that family firms are less prone to the practices of earnings management than non-family firms, and that the association between family firm status and earnings management is moderated by the firm generation. This work contributes to the literature on the quality of financial information in both family firms and unlisted companies, exploring new areas of research.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
