Early Physical Anthropology, Confirmation, and Australian Aboriginal Brains

Abstract

Fahnestock (1984:7) has argued that the importance of a critical historiography of archaeology lies in its ability to generate new insights into the problems and strengths of current theoretical positions with the discipline. This article is an attempt at such a historiography. The basic issues the article deals with are the existence of socio-political values in archaeological research and the relations of those values to hypothesis-testing. A number of archaeologists believe that sophisticated testing procedures allow them to limit, if not eliminate, socio-political values (see Binford and Sabloff 1982). At present, the most generally accepted testing procedure is that known as confirmation (see Salmon 1982; Smith 1977; Wylie 1985). This article will assess the strengths and flaws of confirmation in relation to socio-political values. It will also assess the strengths of another mode of hypothesis-testing, known as refutation (or Falsification). It will do this through a critical analysis of the research strategies of some physical anthropologists who devoted their time to the study of Australian Aboriginal brains.