Ear Candy

Abstract

autumn 2003 issue of this journal featured eight articles offering some uninvited suggestions on international relations and foreign to Paul Martin as he was making his debut as prime minister. In his overview of challenges faced by new Martin cabinet, Denis Stairs cautioned new prime minister against the tendency to indulge in inflated and selfserving rhetoric, clearly designed to appeal to preferences and prejudices of population indoctrinated by its own myths.1 In this, Stairs was reflecting common criticism of foreign of government of Jean Chretien: that over nine years that Chretien was in power, growing gap had emerged between and reality. On one hand, efforts of Chretien government to bring deficit under control had led to dramatic diminution of Canadian capabilities on international stage as Canadian armed forces, foreign service, and development assistance budget were all slashed.2 On other hand, Chretien government sought to cover this declining capacity by turning to what Allan Gotlieb has called feel-good foreign policy marked by a tendency to moralize and proclaim superior values.3 As Stairs put it, grandiose and self-serving rhetoric was crucial to this exercise: The spinning of tales-tales not false, but certainly canted-becomes an increasingly valued and admired art as establishment struggles to bridge gap between what well-intentioned Canadians think and what government really is doing.4In short, over course of 19905, Chretien government increasingly pursued what might be thought of as an approach to foreign policy: government ministers tended to speak about Canada's role in world in terms that were so sweet-sounding to Canadians that not only did convince listeners that their government was actually doing something worthwhile in their name, but it also generated considerable political support for those engaging in rhetoric. But sugar high produced by steady diet of ear candy tends to be no less addictive than diet of real candy: more that their governors fed them feelgood about Canadian foreign policy, more that Canadians appeared to expect such rhetorical excesses from their government-and, as importantly, to be entirely unsatisfied with more honest, realistic, or sober assessments of options available to Canada in real world of world politics. Moreover, dynamic quickly became circular as government ministers themselves became addicted to telling Canadians about their role in international affairs in terms that they knew would generate political support.Although it was hoped by some in 2003 that Martin would bring less rhetorical and more realistic approach to conduct of Canadian foreign policy, it can be argued that Martin himself and government he leads have proved to be as addicted to ear candy in foreign as Chretien government had been.' There is no better indication of this than Martin government's towards humanitarian disaster in western Sudanese region of Darfur that had been unfolding since February aooj.6 atrocity crimes7 in Darfur include killings of tens of thousands of Sudanese citizens by so-called Janjaweed, militias that are, by all credible accounts, armed, supported, and controlled by government of Sudan;8 fanjaweed's systematic use of rape as tool of war; and widespread destruction of villages and crops and theft of livestock that has led not only to displacement of more than 1.5 million Sudanese but also to deaths of tens of thousands more from disease and malnutrition.9This article seeks to examine evolution of Canadian towards Darfur. I will demonstrate that early on significant gap appeared in Canadian policy. prime minister's about Canada's concern for humanitarian crisis became so inflated that it was impossible for government to ensure that its actions matched its rhetoric. …