Abstract
In his recent book, Happiness, Pedro Tabensky has argued for an Aristotelian account of happiness as eudaimonia or flourishing. However, his account of happiness appears to have the unfortunate implication that both individual eudaimonia and global justice are in principle unattainable. I examine Tabensky’s reasons for believing that his account has such unfortunate implications, and suggest that, if appropriately modified, he would be able to avoid them.
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