E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin

Abstract

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesana and Kantin (Philos Phenomenol Res 80(2):447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesana and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood.