Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014

Abstract

Many comparative scholars classify personalist regimes as a distinct category of nondemocratic rule. To measure the process of regime personalization, and to distinguish such a process from overall authoritarian reversal, is difficult in comparative context. Using the Russian political regime in 1999–2014 as a case study, we examine the dynamics of regime personalization over time. Relying on original data on patron–client networks and expert surveys assessing the policy influence of the key members of the ruling coalition, we argue that having more clients, or clients who are more powerful, increases the power of patrons – and that where the patron is the ruler, the resulting measure is an indication of the level of personalization of the regime. We trace regime personalization from the changes in political influence of the president's associates in his patron–client network versus that of other elite patron–client networks. We find that as early as 2004, the Russian regime can be regarded as personalist, and is strongly so from 2006 onward.