Abstract
Alliance networks are the underlying structures of social systems in business, management, and society. The sustainability and dynamics of a social system rely on the structural evolutions of the topologies. Understanding the evolution sheds light on the dynamics and sustainability of a social system. Minority game models have been successfully applied across social science, economy, management, and engineering. They provide simple yet applicable modeling to articulate the evolutionary cooperation dynamics of competitive players in binary decision situations. By extending the minority games played in alliance networks, the cooperation in structured systems of different network topologies is analyzed. In this model, local and global score strategies are considered with and without cooperation rewiring options. The cooperation level, the score, and the topological properties are investigated. The research uses a numerical simulation approach on random networks, scale-free networks, and small-world networks. The results suggest that the network rewiring strategy leads to higher systemic performance with a higher score and a higher level of stability in decision-making. Competitive decision-making can lead to a higher level of cooperation from a poor initial start. However, stubbornness in decision-making can lead to a poor situation when cooperation is discouraged. Players with local or global information adopt local and global score strategies. The results show that local strategies might lead to imbalance, while a global strategy might achieve a relatively stable outcome. This work contributes to bridge minority games in structured networks to study the cooperation between formation and evolution, and calls for future minority game modeling on social networks.
Highlights
The cooperation in social society at an individual or institutional level is a result of social choices made by a group of parties
We focus on the performance measured as the score, the number fluctuation of players choosing side A measured as the standard deviation, and the evolutions of network topologies measured as the degree, clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality
We presented an evolutionary minority game on alliance network (AN) to study the dynamics of cooperation
Summary
The cooperation in social society at an individual or institutional level is a result of social choices made by a group of parties. If a player chooses to be uncooperative in a game, this could lead to possible cancelation of existing edges; an alliance is disbanded To model this kind of binary decision situation, the Minority Game (MG) was proposed [23], and due to its simplicity and broad applicability, MG has been adopted into a wide range of domains, such as social science, economics, and beyond. As the simplest game model, MG sheds lights on the emergence of cooperation and competition of agents [23,24] Along with this thread of studies, it is interesting to study how cooperation evolves for a group of heterogeneous players in a structured alliance network when their decisions are binary, and how the topology of the alliance network and cooperation mutually influence each other.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
