Abstract
A set of computational experiments investigated a model of formal and informal control, showing how selective incentives to work for the collective good may paradoxically lead to enforcement of antisocial norms that oppose the collective good. In these conditions, the widely cited effects of selective incentives, group cohesiveness, and second-order free riding on collective action may be inverted. Mathematical analysis provides some certain bounds on the model's behavior and relaxes several restrictive assumptions used in the simulation research. This complementary view deepens our understanding of second order social control as a solution to problems of collective action.
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