Abstract
We introduce a dynamic price competition model for duopsony. Each buyer receives a privately observed profit shock in each period and uses a publicly observable and retroactive price to entice sellers to sell to her in the upcoming period. The price competition scheme captures sellers’ responsiveness to a price difference and their sensitivity to the sizes of price differences, and it can be easily modified to study symmetric or asymmetric price competition in a duopoly.
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