Abstract
We study identification of time inconsistency when an agent at time 0 makes an advance commitment, and later at time 1 can revise their choice after possibly receiving additional information. Roughly speaking, we prove that the only data that reject time-consistent expected utility maximization is a time-0 choice that is always strictly dominated at time 1. This holds for rich choice sets; if the complete ranking of alternatives is observed in every period and state; when it is natural to assume additional properties like concavity; and with supplementary cardinal information. However, time inconsistency can be point identified from willingness to pay for different alternatives in both periods, if utility from money is plausibly additively-separable and independent of time-1 information.
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