Dynamic Moral Judgments and Emotions

Magda Osman

doi:10.4236/psych.2015.68090

Abstract

We may experience strong moral outrage when we read a news headline that describes a prohibited action, but when we gain additional information by reading the main news story, do our emotional experiences change at all, and if they do in what way do they change? In a single online study with 80 participants the aim was to examine the extent to which emotional experiences (disgust, anger) and moral judgments track changes in information about a moral scenario. The evidence from the present study suggests that we systematically adjust our moral judgments and our emotional experiences as a result of exposure to further information about the morally dubious action referred to in a moral scenario. More specifically, the way in which we adjust our moral judgments and emotions appears to be based on information signalling whether a morally dubious act is permitted or prohibited.

Highlights

The present study takes as its starting point the view that, as with many other cognitive faculties that we have which are adaptive and dynamic, moral judgments and emotional experiences of moral dilemmas may have similar properties (Pessoa, 2008; Wiegmann, Okan, & Nagel, 2012)
The findings suggest that, at least given the experimental set up used in this study, that one key driving force behind changes in moral judgments and emotional experiences are driven by changes in informational content about the morally dubious action, and so updating is guided by external factors rather than changes primarily from emotional experiences independent on the morally dubious action referred to in the scenario
The present study provides new insights into the way in which moral judgments and emotional experiences of moral scenarios change in response to new information

Summary

Introduction

The present study takes as its starting point the view that, as with many other cognitive faculties that we have which are adaptive and dynamic (e.g., decision-making, see Osman, 2010, 2014 for review), moral judgments and emotional experiences of moral dilemmas may have similar properties (Pessoa, 2008; Wiegmann, Okan, & Nagel, 2012). M. Osman tions which in turn increase the severity of their moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Seidel & Prinz, 2013). Osman tions which in turn increase the severity of their moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Seidel & Prinz, 2013) Work such as this adds to the support of general claims that emotions are constitutively involved in the production of moral judgments and the reasons behind those judgments (Greene et al, 2001). From the standpoint of the Social intuitionist model, and other similar models of moral cognition, the causal arrow is set in the direction that emotions come first, and that they are the influential factor that informs the severity of moral judgments. Reasons overlay the judgments with justifications that reflect social conformity to norms that are consistent with the moral judgments made

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Discussion

Conclusion