Abstract
In this paper, we study the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing for a good which exhibits positive network externalities. When network externalities are of sufficient magnitude, we show that, contrary to the Coase theorem, (1) there is no time inconsistency problem; (2) subgame perfect equilibrium prices increase as time passes. From this point of view, positive network externalities allow the monopoly to commit itself credibly to increasing future prices.Ce papier étudie la tarification optimale intertemporelle d'un monopole qui vend un bien exhibant des externalités positives de réseau. Lorsque ces externalités sont suffisamment importantes, nous montrons que, contrairement au théorème de Coase, (1) il n'y a pas de problème d'incohérence temporelle, (2) les prix d'équilibre parfait croissent avec le temps. De ce point de vue, les externalités positives de réseau permettent au monopole de s'engager crédiblement sur une politique de prix futurs à la hausse.
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