Dynamic internet pricing with service level agreements for multihomed clients

Abstract

With the increase in internet coverage and the decrease in internet access price, the demand for good internet service has grown. Clients expect a guarantee in the quality of service (QoS) during internet access. In this paper, we present a model in which clients are given assurances by service providers to be able to connect to the internet and to get the bandwidth requested, and, if clients do not get the services they request, the service provider pays penalties to the clients. We consider internet clients that can dynamically connect to a number of internet service providers (ISP). When a client arrives at an ISP, he has to decide whether to accept the client, and then the price to charge from the client for the duration of its connection. Rejection of a client results in a penalty and delay in getting the requested bandwidth also incurs a penalty. We assume a Poisson arrival process with the rate of arrival sensitive to the price being charged. A client requests bandwidth for a time that is exponentially distributed, then the client is idle for a time that is also exponentially distributed; and then either the client departs or requests bandwidth again after the idle period is over. A service provider tries to maximize its income by charging appropriate prices based on its current state and deciding whether to accept more clients or not. Since penalties are imposed, such solutions also automatically balance load among service providers, and so the QoS to clients improves. We present solutions that maximize the income of service providers. The solutions are then compared using simulation. Simulation results show that our solutions significantly improve QoS of clients and increase the income of service providers as compared to a simple heuristic based solution that could otherwise be used.