Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Multitask Cooperation in Logistics Supply Chain

Song Wang,Yang Zhao,Fuhua Huang,Lanfeng Liu,Maojun Zhang

doi:10.1155/2021/6683240

Abstract

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of multitask cooperation in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) by building a dynamic incentive model. Research shows the following: (1) the implicit reputation in dynamic cooperation can effectively improve system incentive effectiveness; (2) the difference in the contribution of different logistics cooperation to the performance of the LSSC has a significant impact on the incentive effect; (3) when two kinds of cooperation tasks have complementary relationships, both the LSP’s choice of logistics tasks and the incentives will simultaneously act on the two types of cooperation tasks; and (4) the antirisk degree of LSI and the environment uncertainty will also have a certain impact on the incentive effect of the LSSC. Therefore, the LSI should comprehensively consider the requirements of logistics cooperation and the risk tolerance of LSI to be chosen.

Highlights

In logistics supply chain (LSSC), logistics service integrator (LSI) occupies a dominant position and faces customers directly, so it can accurately determine the potential needs of customers
From the long-run perspective, a dynamic incentive model under multitask cooperation is constructed to simulate the cross-phase cooperation of logistics service supply chain (LSSC). is paper focuses on the following issues: how does the implicit reputation effect affect the behavior of partners in the dynamic cooperation course of LSSC? How does the relevance of the two types of cooperation tasks and the Logistics service providers (LSPs) antirisk degree affect incentive effectiveness? According to the above research, this paper may provide a certain reference for the design and implementation of the incentive mechanism in the operation of LSSC
In the principal-agent relationship between SSI and LSP in LSSC, a great number of researches focus on the mechanism of regular cooperation tasks of logistics activities

Summary

Introduction

In logistics supply chain (LSSC), logistics service integrator (LSI) occupies a dominant position and faces customers directly, so it can accurately determine the potential needs of customers. In LSSC, the leading LSI, as designers and providers of integrated logistics service solutions, has high requirements for cooperating in different types of aspects. Due to the high complexity and dynamic nature of integrated logistics service, the large number of logistics service requires LSI, LSP, and client companies to cooperate in multiple phases. Lau et al [4] in response to different market needs, the change in retailer risk cost, supplier incentive cost, and general agent cost in Mathematical Problems in Engineering two-stage supply chain and their influence on the maximum profit of supply chain are studied by the condition of complete or incomplete information. After introducing the incentive and punishment mechanisms [13, 14], it is further discovered that the rewards and punishments and the number of cooperation have a positive impact on the promotion of enterprise open collaborative innovation. From the long-run perspective, a dynamic incentive model under multitask cooperation is constructed to simulate the cross-phase cooperation of LSSC. is paper focuses on the following issues: how does the implicit reputation effect affect the behavior of partners in the dynamic cooperation course of LSSC? How does the relevance of the two types of cooperation tasks and the LSP antirisk degree affect incentive effectiveness? According to the above research, this paper may provide a certain reference for the design and implementation of the incentive mechanism in the operation of LSSC

Parameter Setting and Model Construction

The Equilibrium Analyzing

Conclusion