Abstract
Green innovation for supply chain has attracted much academic attention. Yet, there is no adequate understanding of how spillover and cooperation can impact the enterprises’ green innovation decisions in the presence of free-rider. Besides, the dynamic impact of green innovation on emission is still lack of attention. We develop a differential game model that explicitly considers a supply chain with two types of manufacturers (i.e., green innovation and free-riding) to examine the dynamics of green innovation. The analysis reveals that under the noncooperation mode, the emissions and profits of free-riding manufacturers are found to be lower than that of innovating manufacturers, but technology spillovers will narrow the gap between them. Under the cooperation mode, there would be greater innovation efforts of green manufacturers and lesser efforts of green suppliers. Moreover, technology spillovers will have less impact on optimal decision changes. The profit of free-riding manufacturers is higher than that of innovating manufacturers, but the initial market power will affect the changes in their sales and profits. Meanwhile, cooperation will increase the total emission amount and long-term profits of the green supply chain, and technology spillovers of green manufacturers will help narrow the emission gap and broaden the profit gap, while that of the suppliers will have the opposite effect. The present study provides a new perspective for research on green innovation decisions for supply chain.
Highlights
With rapid industrialization, innumerable resources are leading to insurmountable pollution generated by human activities, in particular, fossil fuel combustion producing greenhouse gases, which leads to global warming and seriously threatening the global natural ecological balance [1]
Based on the equilibrium analysis of the two models, three problems are solved through a comparative analysis: (1) whether competing in the homogeneous product market can encourage enterprises to change from free-riding to innovation; (2) whether the green supply chain members are willing to innovate and cooperate; and (3) the impact of technology spillover on the enterprise’s green innovation decision and cooperation strategy
When enterprises attempt to reduce emissions in the production process through green innovation, two issues must be considered: (1) the impact of green innovation enterprise’s technology spillovers on the emissions of different entities and (2) the impact of green innovation efforts on emissions is dynamic, and the innovation efforts the enterprise at various times have different adjustments to emissions. e present study examined the green innovation decision-making problem of green supply chain enterprises under the green innovation noncooperation and cooperation modes when there is an asymmetric technology spillover in the “one-to-two” supply chain structure and obtained the optimal solution and steady-state equilibrium by the differential game model
Summary
Innumerable resources are leading to insurmountable pollution generated by human activities, in particular, fossil fuel combustion producing greenhouse gases, which leads to global warming and seriously threatening the global natural ecological balance [1]. In other words, when the free-riding enterprises suffer from both horizontal and vertical technology spillovers, they will reduce pollution emission. (3) Whether innovation cooperation in the green supply chain can improve supply chain profits and reduce emissions To address these issues, a supply chain model with two types of manufacturers (green innovation and free-riding) and a shared green supplier was established. In the case of vertical innovation noncooperation and cooperation in the green supply chain, the impact of asymmetric technology spillover on the optimal innovation decision of the green manufacturer and the green supplier is considered.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have