Dynamic Games With Asymmetric Information and Resource Constrained Players With Applications to Security of Cyberphysical Systems

Abstract

We model attacks on a cyberphysical system as a game between two players—the attacker and the system. The players may not acquire the complete information about each other, and that leads to an asymmetric information game. Furthermore, the players may have a certain fixed amount of resources, which constrains their strategies across time. Accordingly, we consider a dynamic multiplayer nonzero sum game with asymmetric information in which controllers have total resource constraints. Under certain assumptions on the information structure of the game, we devise an algorithm that computes a subclass of Nash equilibria of the game. We also study a denial-of-service attack on a cyberphysical system, model it as two-player zero-sum games, and apply our algorithm to compute the saddle-point equilibrium strategies of the attacker and the controller.