Dynamic game decision about supply chain resource integration in mass customization

Abstract

How to deal with the contradiction between mass production effect and customized demand is the key problem on mass customization (MC). With the development of supply chain management, we can settle the contradiction through flexible and effective supply chain operation and it relies on rational supply chain resource integration (SCRI). However, supply chain operation in MC has special characters, mainly reflected in the random order information and the outstanding changes of collaborative benefits and risks which will influence the SCRI process and the collaborative psychology and negotiation state between two integration sides. Through analyzing the integration framework from the relations of integration input and output, this paper gives a deep analysis on multi-stage dynamic game process about SCRI in MC from the view of balancing the benefits and risks among both negotiation sides and points out that the integration is a collaborative game process. Through dividing the game process reasonably, this paper describes the game stage features and the index changes of resource individuals' psychological expectations and appeals of their benefits and risks by fuzzy membership functions, and then puts forward a dynamic game decision method. Finally, testing by an application case, the method is feasible and effective.