Abstract

For achieving the goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, the government will further strengthen subsidies to enterprises for carbon emission reduction. This paper investigates the long-term repeated game behavior of manufacturer and retailer in multichannel supply chains under three different forms of government subsidies. The long-term repeated game behavior of manufacturer and retailer is studied under the manufacturer green innovation subsidy model (IS model), manufacturer production subsidy model (MS model) and retailer sales subsidy model (RS model). Under three situations, excessive price adjustment can easily lead to system instability and sharp fluctuations in profits. Two methods are used for chaos control and management, and the parameter adjustment control method is found having more advantages for system re-stabilization.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.