Abstract
In this paper, by introducing the concept of 'tolerance level of small shareholders', we analyse the large shareholders' private benefits from control power in dynamic equilibrium from a micro-angle. We identify the positive sides of the private benefits and provide the factors that affect the large shareholders' infringement behavior against the benefits, and the relations between them. What's more, this paper gives an argument that the large shareholders' risk preference itself would constrain their infringement behavior.
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