Abstract
This brief reply redefends the view that two distinct conceptions of the justification and structure of constitutional rights can be found in constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the discourse of constitutional adjudication. The first is labeled the immunities conception; the second is characterized as the structural or reason‐restraining conception of rights. This reply also defends the common association of Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously with the immunities view, while recognizing that multiple conceptions of the justifications and structure of rights can be found in Dworkin's corpus of writings.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
