Abstract
Abstract For decades Ronald Dworkin defended the view that legal interpretation is constructive. One of his most fascinating arguments for this idea, which turns on an analogy between legal and literary interpretation, has been more or less ignored by philosophers of law—probably because they have not been especially interested in the claims about literary interpretation that it presupposes. This chapter explores Dworkin's analogical argument with the sensitivity it deserves, and with particular attention to its controversial ideas about the interpretation of literature. The chapter evaluates the implications of Dworkin’s analogy for his overall anti-positivist project, and for one’s thinking about legal interpretation more generally.
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