DWORKIN AND DICEY: THE RULE OF LAW AS INTEGRITY

Abstract

In his book, Law's Empire,1 Ronald Dworkin offers a powerful reinterpretation of the Western liberal ideal of the Rule of Law. He is anxious to distinguish his project from utopian political theory: he wishes to offer practical guidance to legislators, officials and judges in contemporary society. Ordinary politics and utopian theory share certain ideals. Fairness requires a political structure which distributes power correctly. Justice requires a morally acceptable distribution of material resources and the protection of civil liberties.2 In ordinary politics if not in utopian theory, however, justice and fairness often conflict. We must therefore embrace integrity as a distinct political ideal which may itself conflict with both justice and fairness. Integrity assumes an (essentially metaphorical) personification of the state, which is to be treated as a moral agent: 'we insist that the state act on a single, coherent set of principles even when its citizens are divided about what the right principles of justice and fairness really are.'3 This ideal explains our repugnance to what Dworkin calls 'checkerboard' statutes-for example, a statute making abortion illegal for women born in even years but not for those born in odd ones (even though the nation is divided on the morality of abortion).4 We expect the law to be consistent in principle, even though we may disagree about what the principle should be.