Dwelling on the Everyday World: Phenomenological Analyses and Social Reality: Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications . George Psathas.

Abstract

Anthropological interest in phenomenological approach has been virtually nil-at least in Anglo-American traditions (there are, of course, exceptions, e.g., Fabian 1970 or Lansing 1974). This is unfortunate for several reasons. For one, intent of phenomenological description is closely akin to that of ethnography (see Psathas 1968). For another, some anthropologists can be considered phenomenological in their approach, if implicitly so. This is case, for example, with Evans-Pritchard (see Horton and Finnegan 1973: 60ff.) and perhaps Clifford Geertz (1960). Most importantly, anthropology can learn from phenomenology. Its potential contribution, especially to ethnographic description, should not be neglected. At same time, anthropology cannot, in my estimation, remain content with a phenomenological approach. What is phenomenology? There are, of course, many phenomenologies (as there are empiricisms, structuralisms, Marxisms, etc.) but Psathas' introduction nevertheless reveals its central paradigmatic features. Phenomenology is interested in aspects of human conduct (p. 3) as expressed in and by features of of everyday life (p. 8). This requires attentiveness to constitutive, intersubjective, and interactional processes by which human beings in society sustain and create shared meanings, that is, people live with and renew their (p. 16). We can hope to arrive at this social of common consensus by bracketing our own assumptions (a sort of intentional disinterestedness). We will know that we have succeeded if the results of an inquiry fit, make sense, and are true to understanding of ordinary actors in everyday world (p. 12). All this sounds familiar, especially in an ethnographic context. In theory at least, anthropological description also seeks to capture everyday worlds of native peoples. In actual practice, I think we can learn a great deal from phenomenological approach (as one properly ethnographic study in Psathas' volume attests). But is this all that should concern us? The comparative ethnologist is not likely to think so and neither, for that matter, does editor of Phenomenological Sociology. Psathas strains to bring phenomenological method (a reflexive and radical empiricism) into realm of abstract social theory: Eidetic analysis aims at seeing through particulars (concrete, existential) to discover what is essential (ideal, typical) (p. 10). We thus move from microlevel to macrolevel and back again (e.g., how social systems are intended and/or experienced by social actor). In other words, subjective and existential reality of person must be weighed against objective and encountered reality of social institutions, cultural ideologies, etc. Even criteria of verification are effected: sense ordinary actors make of our scientific analyses is no longer sufficient. In fact, we are enjoined not to naively accept informants' statements as sufficient explanation (pp. 15ff.).