Duty Sui Generis and the Individual in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Abstract

In this paper I examine Kant’s argument that human beings are morally obligated to join or establish a religious “ethical community” as a therapy for “radical evil.” Kant regards this as a duty sui generis, because the human propensity to evil cannot be eradicated. This requirement seems to conflict with the fundamental axiom of Kant’s moral philosophy that “ought” implies “can” — i.e. that we are only morally responsible for what is within our power. Although, on Kant’s account, evil has no cause outside the individual’s free decision to deviate from the moral law, Kant’s religious writings would require us to regard it precisely as though it had a phenomenal cause. I seek to show how this duty sui generis in Kant’s Religion essay can be made compatible with Kant’s ethical writings, arguing that this constitutes an intriguing, pragmatic moment in Kant’s practical philosophy.