Duty Evasion in Free Trade Agreements: Norm Emergence and Implications

Abstract

Despite the failure of states to adopt multilateral rules to address the circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, efforts have more recently been deployed by the United States to focus on the issue of ‘duty evasion’. After failed attempts to discuss the issue at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) specifically addresses cooperation between Parties regarding information sharing and duty evasion verification requests with a view to ensuring the enforcement of trade remedy laws. Can the elaboration of duty evasion provisions in regional trade agreements facilitate the negotiation of rules to address the issue of anti-circumvention at the multilateral level? This article argues that the motivations and inherent limits underlying the USMCA duty evasion provisions are most likely to impede broad adoption at the multilateral level. It proceeds in two steps. First, while the United States is playing a pivotal role as a norm entrepreneur in the emergence of these duty evasion provisions, the article demonstrates a clear evolution in its strategy toward a populist approach to international economic policy. Second, after identifying similarities with other provisions, the article addresses the lacunae in the USMCA duty evasion provisions from a legal perspective. duty evasion, anti-circumvention, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, norm entrepreneur, populism