Duty as a value-legal phenomenon

Abstract

In the course of its development, each society tried to create a certain set of established rules of behavior to regulate social relations, as a result of which various models of mandatory, prohibited or permitted behavior were formed. The general rule for building the specified models was to grant the participants of social relations subjective rights and impose legal obligations on them. So, of course, duty is an extremely important component both in the regulation of social relations and the construction of a proper legal order, as well as in the functioning of legal systems as a whole. However, despite such an important role, the category of duty has rarely been subject to comprehensive research, so we consider it appropriate to analyze the nature of such a concept as «duty», in particular, to focus attention on it through the prism of its value character. In addition, the relevance of the study of this topic is determined by the problem of duty, and in particular, the problem of its implementation and proper execution, which is the subject of constant discussions in society. Also, the basis for a proper study of the category of duty is a certain limitation of its perception as an exclusively legal category, since, in our opinion, duty is a broader concept that can be confidently called a value-legal phenomenon. Thus, the article carried out a study of the chronological development of the category of duty, starting from the birth of the first social duties, ending with the construction of the legal concept of duty in modern society.
 In the course of writing the article, an attempt was made to provide our own interpretation of duty as a value-legal phenomenon, and to explain on the basis of what we consider duty to be a value. Attention is also drawn to the fact that manifestations of legal nihilism appear in modern society, which actually has a negative effect on the affirmation of duty as a value.