Durable authoritarianism in the Arab Spring

Abstract

Large popular protests against non-democratic rule swept much of the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Why did non-violent and armed rebellions emerge in some countries, but not in others? Why did some autocrats fall from power under pressure 'from below', but not others? Theoretical debates on the impact of structural and institutional factors on the stability of political regimes and democratization suggest possible avenues for research. Oil wealth empowered some autocrats to avoid large popular protests and helped others to weather them out without major problems. Huge profits from oil exports reduced demands for political representation, enabled autocrats to 'buy' loyalty of their population and strengthened the repressive apparatus, as well as the readiness of its members to use force against their political opponents. In addition, the survival of Arab monarchies, and of the Algerian regime, suggests that authoritarian regimes are more stable than sultanist (personalist) ones. The broader social base of authoritarianism and resulting regime coalitions, and strong political institutions, reduced the pool for recruitment of protesters and made a firm government response possible. Sultanistic regimes, by contrast, faced existential threat because of highly unpopular personalist rule and dynastic tendencies, narrow social base, widespread corruption and ineffective rule.