Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy

Abstract

that extensive public statements in the midst of the events to which the statements pertain were a desirable means of securing the support of his countrymen for, and educating them about, the policies he wished to pursue.1 Many share this belief, but how tenable is it? If such statements should actually create or deepen public misunderstanding of the instant situation, of the nature of foreign policy, and of the nature of international politics, then they may come at too high a price, even if one concedes a gain in having public opinion behind the policy the statements are designed to assist; even if one concedes the soundness of that particular policy. Indeed, the price may be too high for precisely the reason which presumably inspired the Secretary to employ his device. That reason is the presumably crucial role which public opinion plays in shaping American foreign policy, which we do not dispute. But such influence can be for ill as well as for good: erroneous public views, as much as correct ones, about the international political process and the role of the United States therein will be reflected, sooner or later, in particular policies.2 Using the events of the first phase of the Suez crisis, from July 26 to October 30, 1956, an attempt is made here to test the validity of Mr. Dulles' belief. No judgment is ventured as to the wisdom of his Suez policy, a large question in itself.3 Rather, attention is directed to (1) the extent to which the image of the Suez situation during this period, which the Secretary's statements were designed to create, was consistent with the realities of that situation, and (2) the significance of such discrepancy between image and reality as may be found to have occurred.