Abstract

For most of our nation’s history, the police power was limited by a neutrality principle that prohibited the commandeering of public law for private interests. Today, the judiciary’s abdication of its role as sentinel of liberty, good governance, and the public interest has allowed special interests to exercise raw political power for their own benefit and to the detriment of their competitors, counterparts, and everyone else. The Supreme Court’s failed experiment in interest-group pluralism merits return to a conception of law, due process, and neutrality that was once central to our constitutional design. Using one state’s assymetrical restrictions on the sale of liquor as an example, this Note demonstrates how courts armed with a robust neutrality principle would guard against legislative corruption, promote good governance and the public interest, and preserve liberty.

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