Dual-Stackelberg game-based trading in community integrated energy system considering uncertain demand response and carbon trading

Abstract

Given the uncertainties in integrated demand response and carbon trading mechanism, this paper utilizes a dual-Stackelberg game framework to propose trading strategies among multiple entities within such a system. The innovation of this study lies in its development of a collaborative optimization method that encompasses extensive competition between the supply and demand sides, considering the synergistic incentives of carbon trading on the source-side and uncertain responses on the load-side. Firstly, a typical system framework is constructed involving various participants, clarifying energy and carbon market mechanisms and incorporating users’ psychological characteristics in demand response uncertainty. Secondly, a dual-Stackelberg game model is established, and the existence and uniqueness of game equilibrium are demonstrated. Finally, the model's effectiveness is validated through various scenarios. The results indicate that the equilibrium benefits of each entity are 6643.81, 7747.16, 8029.01 yuan, and 9326.62 yuan. The carbon trading mechanism can effectively constrain and reduce the system's carbon emissions by 10.20 %. Furthermore, accounting for user uncertainties in integrated demand response behavior leads to an 18.54 % increase in the peak-to-valley difference in electricity demand. It is concluded that the presented methodology provides innovative insights for addressing trading challenges within hierarchical integrated energy markets.