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Abstract
It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler’s discussion of the mind–body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties of dualism, and so overlooks the important metaphysical insights of contemporary dualist philosophers. I argue that while the neuroscientific research underpinning biological psychiatry challenges the traditional dualism of René Descartes, it does not pose any problem for the more modern dualism of David Chalmers. It is possible to take seriously the scientific claims of biological psychiatry while holding that this latter form of dualism is true. This has implications for the positioning of the mind–body problem in psychiatry. While the “easy” problem of explaining psychological processes is relevant to the aims of biological psychiatry, psychiatrists need not worry about the “hard” problem of consciousness.
Highlights
Biological psychiatry is an approach to psychiatry that seeks to explain and conceptualise mental disorders as biological processes in the brain
While not without its critics, such as those who comment on the absence of biomarkers in psychiatry (Bentall 2009; Moncrieff 2010) and those who argue that it neglects the important role of the social environment in constituting mental disorder (Fuchs 2012; Levy 2013; Davies 2016; Cooper 2017), biological psychiatry remains a dominant paradigm in contemporary psychiatric research and practice
This misrepresentation encourages the misconception that dualism is a defunct theory, as it overlooks the important metaphysical contributions of contemporary philosophers who propose that physicalism fails to account for consciousness and that dualism is the only acceptable account (Chalmers 1996; Gertler 2008; Nida-Rümelin 2010; Fürst 2011; BonJour 2013)
Summary
Biological psychiatry is an approach to psychiatry that seeks to explain and conceptualise mental disorders as biological processes in the brain. This would avoid the causal exclusion problem, because while it accepts that the phenomenal is metaphysically distinct from the physical, it only grants the latter a role in the causation of behaviour This is compatible with the claims of biological psychiatry, because it does not dispute the causal story of how psychiatric disorders are physically produced by biological processes. It is not necessary to answer the metaphysical question of why these neuronal mechanisms are accompanied by phenomenal qualities This confusion regarding the different parts of the mind–body problem is philosophically unfortunate, but can have unfavourable implications for neuroscientific research relevant to biological psychiatry. While the “hard” problem of why the psychological states are associated with phenomenal qualities is philosophically important, it does not pose a particular challenge for the causal explanatory and therapeutic aims of biological psychiatry. Biological psychiatry may be in tension with traditional dualism, the modern dualism I endorse provides such practitioners a way of maintaining the irreducibility of subjective experience while accepting the scientific claims of biological psychiatry
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