Dualism and Exclusion

Bram Vaassen

doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00118-1

Abstract

Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (Australas J Philos 95(1):96–108, 2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation.

Highlights

Some philosophers argue that all effects have sufficient physical causes and that properties which cannot be reduced to the physical are excluded from being causes
Non-reductionist phsyicalists often contend that such exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal, such as being a hurricane, or having an infection, from being causes as well (e.g. Block 2003; Woodward 2008; Yablo 1992)
It is a matter of dispute whether exclusion arguments pose a serious problem for non-reductionist physicalism

Summary

Introduction

Some philosophers argue that all effects have sufficient physical causes and that properties which cannot be reduced to the physical are excluded from being causes.1 They conclude from this that non-reductionist theories of the mind, B. Distinct properties can cause the same effects, but only if they stand in a sufficiently tight relation to one another. Many contemporary dualists claim that conscious properties are nomologically necessitated by physical properties in the actual world and explicitly deny that they are nomologically distinct.

Results

Conclusion