Abstract

Recent adversarial attack research reveals the vulnerability of learning-based deep learning models (DNN) against well-designed perturbations. However, most existing attack methods have inherent limitations in image quality as they rely on a relatively loose noise budget, i.e., limit the perturbations by L p -norm. Resulting that the perturbations generated by these methods can be easily detected by defense mechanisms and are easily perceptible to the human visual system (HVS). To circumvent the former problem, we propose a novel framework, called DualFlow, to craft adversarial examples by disturbing the image's latent representations with spatial transform techniques. In this way, we are able to fool classifiers with human imperceptible adversarial examples and step forward in exploring the existing DNN's fragility. For imperceptibility, we introduce the flow-based model and spatial transform strategy to ensure the calculated adversarial examples are perceptually distinguishable from the original clean images. Extensive experiments on three computer vision benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet) indicate that our method can yield superior attack performance in most situations. Additionally, the visualization results and quantitative performance (in terms of six different metrics) show that the proposed method can generate more imperceptible adversarial examples than the existing imperceptible attack methods.

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