Abstract
With the rapid development of the Internet and changes in consumer buying habits, many manufacturers are increasingly relying on online channels to sell their products as opposed to traditional retail channels. In this study, we innovatively investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumer green preferences (CGP) on supply chain performance and product green level in the dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC). Specifically, four models of DCGSC (centralized, independent CSR, cooperative CSR, and collaboration contract) are investigated. Next, we use game theory to investigate the optimal product green level, online and offline selling prices, social welfare, profits of supply chain enterprises, and the whole supply chain under the four models. We give numerical examples to demonstrate the effectiveness and viability of the four models. We find several interesting conclusions. First, increasing the attention to both CSR and CGP by supply chain enterprises is conducive to stimulating innovation and improving product green level. Second, when supply chain enterprises actively execute their CSR, they can reasonably control online and offline selling prices and increase consumer surplus and the profits of whole supply chain and social welfare are increased. Third, it is beneficial to increase the value of supply chain enterprises to enhance CSR within a certain threshold, but when CSR is higher than the threshold, the profitability of supply chain enterprises is weakened. Finally, collaboration contracts are capable of coordinating DCGSC and guaranteeing the profitability of supply chain enterprises.
Highlights
With the rapid development of the Internet and changes in consumer buying habits, many manufacturers are increasingly relying on online channels to sell their products as opposed to traditional retail channels
We innovatively investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumer green preferences (CGP) on supply chain performance and product green level in the dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC)
Proposition 9 shows that the profits of the DCGSC and social welfare are higher in the MR model than in the M model, which shows that the retailer shares part of the CSR costs, causing the manufacturer’s increased marginal revenue to be higher than the retailer’s reduced marginal revenue. e profits of the DCGSC and social welfare under a combination coordination contract are higher than both MR and M models, which indicates that a combination coordination contract optimizes the dual-channel green supply chain, increases the overall revenue of the supply chain, and improves social welfare
Summary
CSR practices have a significant influence on environmentally sustainable development [11]. Scholars around the world are increasingly interested in CSR [12, 13] and ways of incorporating CSR into supply chain decision-making. As the global concern for green sustainable development increases, it extends to the impact of CSR on green innovation, for example, the report by Leng et al [15] which elucidated that CSR information disclosure can significantly ease financing constraints, thereby positively affecting the sustainability of corporate innovation. CSR positively affects green performance and effectively enhances the ability to achieve green performance [16, 17]. Shahzad et al [18] examined how CSR affects corporate sustainability performance. It is not enough for enterprises to focus only on their own CSR, it is the joint fulfillment of CSR by supply chain enterprises that is favorable to maintain environmental sustainability [28]. Our study differs from previous studies in that we focus on the execution of CSR by manufacturers and focus on the impact of CSR on the decision-making in the DCGSC from the perspective of manufacturers and retailers performing CSR together
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